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by Greg Lee. 
Vietnam or Indochina, has a 
long bloody history, stretching 
back over thrJ:e decades. It has 
known many faces and many 
uniforms. 
Contrary to popular belief, 
America's presence in Vietnam is 
over 25 years old. America's 
policies toward the Vietnams 
and the Vietnamese have been, 
tragically, complex and 
paradoxical. 
All too often, Americans 
view our actions in Vietnam as a 
necessary and well planned 
action of "freemen" against the 
inroads of Communist 
aggression. The truth is that our 
policies have been unclear and 
half-hearted and the present way 
is an out-growth of that 
confusion. The Vietnam War was 
started in the late 40's and early 
50's when the post WW-II world 
was being reshaped and rebuilt. 
It is imperative that the 
general public, in order to assess 
the present action in Vietnam 
correctly, knows a little of the 
background of American 
diplomatic and military action in 
Southeast Asia and the "shifting 
sands" of our attitudes and 
policy. 
Briefly, American policies in 
Vietnam, or Indochina, can be 
subdivided as follows: 
1. Anti-Vichy 1940-45 
2. Pro-Vietminh 1945-46 
3. Non-Involvement 1946-50 
4. Pro-French 1950-54 
5. Economic Involvement 
1954-61 
6 . Direct and Full 
Involvement 1961-
When France was overrun in 
1940 by the Germans and an 
armistice had been signed with 
Hitler, French Indochina, like 
most of France's colonial 
possessions, was left to take care 
of itself. Unfortunately, due to 
the · colony's closeness to) apan 
and its rich deposits of tin and 
rubber, Indochina became a 
predictable target of aggression 
from the Japanese. 
It is significant that while 
Japan was pressuring the French 
in Indochina to "co-operate," 
the United States could not or 
would not intervene to fight 
against the Japanese (The United 
States paid dearly for its 
neutrality at Pearl Harbor.). 
Requests for help from 
Indochina were never acted 
.upon, and Indochina became 
subject to occupation by 
Japanese forces. 
The next United States 
move in Indochina was to supply 
anti-Japanese (but still 
Communist) guerilla forces 
under the command of North 
Vietnam's General Giap, with 
specially trained OSS instructors 
to train, supply, and lead the 
unarmed and untrained guerillas. 
Unknown at the time, the 
Ji! tmitetl .§tates was setting the 
stage fo~ developments. 
With the end of the war in 
sight, the Big Three of the allies 
met at Yalta to discuss plans and 
schemes for rebuilding and 
reconstructing a better post-war 
world. As is often the case 
through history, the seeds of war 
are sown when men meet and 
talk of peace ... Yalta was no 
exception. 
At Yalta, the "TtUsteeship" 
and the issue of co'onial areas 
caused a great deal of hassle and 
problems for the allies. But the 
"Big Three" decided that all 
colonies including Indochina 
would be returned to their 
former possessors. It was this 
conference that led to the 
present conflict in Vietnam. 
VJ Day made a Vietminh 
takeover in Hanoi possible. 
Successfully hiding their 
.communist background, the 
Vietminh leaders managed to 
make it apparent not only to the 
populace of Indochina but to 
the Chinese and French that· 
they had been recognized by the 
United States. In actuality, 
though, no official recognition 
had taken place. The Vietrninh 
were proceeding with plans to 
form a new government to 
represent the Indochinese, all 
independent of France. 
Unfortunately, the 
Vietrninh-United States relations 
worsened. Whether this was due 
to a deliberate mess-up or 
·conversely to a lack of policy 
isn't clear yet, but the United 
States condemned itself to the 
present war in Vietnam, by not 
trying to mediate French and 
Vietminh positions. As relations 
between the west and ·the 
Vietminh worsened in late 1946, 
two ambassadors, Mr. Moffat 
and Mr. Landon were sent to 
Hanoi to see Ho Chi Minh 
several times. They were 
impressed with Ho, but decided 
in favor of helping the French 
rather than the newly formed 
dissident government. Thus Ho 
was left to face the returning 
French army. The first and last 
French-Indochinese war broke 
out on December 19, 1946. The 
United States occupied 
elsewhere in Europe ceased to be 
an effective arbiter in Southeast 
Asia until Korea in 1952. 
MORATORIUM HEADQUARTERS 
IN THE 
THEATER TECHNICAL OFFICE 
IN THE 
LOBBY Of THE AUDITORIUM 
COME IN AND SEE WHAT YOU CAN DO 
TO WORK FOR PEACE 






8:00 a.m. - 7:30 p.m. 
VIGIL TO SHOW CONCERN FOR THE PAST AND FUTURE 
WAR DEAD OF ALL NATIONS (on the Quadrangle) 
8:30 a.m. -lO:30 a.m. 
SEMINAR: VIETNAM: THE COUNTRY AND THE PEOPLE 
(Women's Lounge on Great Hill) 
lO:OO a.m. 
..... 
Speaker: Maurice Donahue, President, Massachusetts Senate 
(Horace Mann Auditorium) 
ll:OO a.m SEMINAR: WHAT THE WAR IS DOING TO THE 
COUNTRY (Tillinghast Reception Room) 
12:00 noon: 
Joint Newman Club-Christian Fellowship Peace Service 
(Newman Center) 
1:00 p.m. 
SEMINAR: THE MORAL AND ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF 
THE WAR (Newman Center and C.F. Center) 
2:00 p.m. 
SEMINAR: WHY AMERICA IS STILL IN THE WAR 
(Woodward Reception Room) 
3:00 p.m. 
SEMINAR: GENERAL DISCUSSION (Reception Room -
Lower Campus Men's) 
4:00 p.m. 




... CIRCULATION OF PETITIONS IN THE COLLEGE 
COMMUNITY AND IN SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES' 
. .. PROVIDING DISCUSSION WADERS FOR AREA HIGH 
SCHOOLS 
... DlSTRIBUTIONS OF LITERATURE AT PLACES OF 
BUSINESS AND FACTORIES 
... DlSCUSSIONS IN THE COLLEGE CLASSROOM ON THE 
WAR 
... REQUESTS TO STUDENTS INVOLVED IN JUNIOR AND 
SENIOR TRAINING TO DISCUSS THE WAR WITH THEIR 
CLASSES. 
Senate Pres Donahue 
To Address 
BSC Moratorium 
BRIDGEWATER - The 
President of the Massachusetts 
Senate, Maurice A. Donahue, 
will address the Moratorium 
Observance on October 15th, 
1969. Senator Donahue is 
expected to make a strong 
anti-war speech in the Horace 
Mann Auditorium at lO:OO a.m. 
tomorrow morning, according to 
an announcement by Michael 
Magu.ire, Chairman of the 
Bridgewater Moratorium 
Committee. 
A long time foe of the 
Vietnam conflict, Senator 
Donahue is the leading opponent 
in Massachusetts to the ABM 
deployment. Donahue came 
under attack at the infamous 
Chicago Democratic Convention 
last year when he came out in 
favor of the Kennedy- McGovern 
Peace Plank, a highly unpopular 
move at that time. 
Donahue was quoted 
recently as saying "national 
priorities are very distorted, and I 
don't feel President Nixon is 
acting with the speed needed to 
end that vicious war." Senator 
Donahue will conduct a question . 
and answer period after his 
address, which is, again, 
scheduled for 10:00 a.m. 
Troop Withdrawal 
Bogs Down 
by Joseph Kraft 
(Reprinted from the Boston 
Globe, Monday, August 25, 
1969). SAIGON - The initial 
reduction of 25,000 troops 
ordered by President Nixon for 
Vietnam is due to be completed 
at the end of this week. But it 
will be very surprising if at that 
time total American forces here 
are less than 5000 below what 
they were when Mr. Nixon took 
office. 
The American officials in 
Saigon are far less keen than 
American officials back home on 
the issue of troop withdrawal. 
A nd Saigon's formidable 
negative powers are almost 
. certain to reduce withdrawal to 
mere tokenism unless the 
President shows far more 
determination on the issue than 
has thus far been displayed. 
At the root of the issue are 
major but unavowed differences 
between Washington and Saigon 
on the overall situation in 
Vietnam. The conventional 
stateside wisdom, that the 
Communists still have plenty of 
shots left in their locker, is not 
shared here. Here the prevailing 
view is that the other side is on 
the ropes. 
The United States Military 
Commander, Gen. Creighton 
Abrams, believes that North 
(Continued on Page ~) 
by Dave Wilson 
BRIDGEWATER- In case 
you have any preconceived 
notions about the Vietnam War 
that you don't wish to have 
destroyed, please put this article 
aside and go read the Student 
Handbook or something similar. 
This reporter is not a 
Communist, nor a subversive 
bent on undermining our troops 
in that war, indeed, I'm an Army 
veteran and a former strong 
supporter of the madness which 
has taken over 40,000 young 
American lives. My eyes have 
been opened. Perhaps your 
opinion may be altered by the 
time you finish reading ~his 
article; but, regardless of what 
you think, I only hope that you 
do think about the Vietnam 
War. And 1 hope you think 
about it every hour of every day 
- and realize the horror of men 
killing men for an idea. 
Let's forget the ridiculous 
charges that the Moratorium is 
being run by the Communists 
and all of us who are taking part 
are blind sheep. I won't dignify 
those remarks with a reply. I 
arrived at my conclusions after 
carefully investigating all the 
facts I could assemble, and this 
Moratorium has provided me 
with a democratic vehicle to 
express my discontent with the 
United States involvement in the 
Vietnam War. Perhaps the best 
way to explain my position is 
with an analogy that will have 
some meaning. 
If, in 1954, the United States 
was divided by a foreign power 
or powers into two political 
countries, WOUldn't we all still 
be Americans? Especially if the 
partition was forced upon us? 
Anyway you want to look at it, 
we would be, and by the same 
token the North Vietnamese are 
just as Vietnamese as their 
brothers in the South. If you 
care to draw an even finer line, 





They're South Vietnamese. So 
what is the United States 
involved in? A dam civil war. 
A fter the French were defeated 
in 1954, we set up a despotic, 
unpopular regime in the South, 
and have been struggling ever 
since to support it and its 
equally unfortunate successors. 
Joseph Alsop, even today one of 
the few big-name columnists still 
an avid supporter of the war, 
said of the Diem regime which 
the U.S. propped up from the 
period 1954 all the way into the 
six ties, "the country, under 
Diem, was a charming 
concentration camp." 
A national news magazine 
recently published the rather 
startling news that nobody, 
that's nobody, ever asked the 
U.S. to intervene in Vietnam -
we never received an R.S.V.P. 
When the French were 
fighting the Vietminh, again 
Vietnamese, in an attempt to 
regain their colonial power, you 
can guess who we supported. On 
June 27, 1950, President Harry 
Truman announced that the U.S. 
would furnish military assistance 
to the French to fight the 
Vietminh, and from then until 
the French were defeated in 
1954 we provided 80% of the 
cost of the war. The Vietminh 
were fighting for their 
independence just like we had 
fought for ours, and the United 
States turned their backs on 
them and supported the French. 
Free elections to unify the 
country were supposed to take 
place in 1956. The United States, 
ever wary that the tottering 
Diem regime would be knocked 
out of power, quickly set up 
SEATO, an eight nation treaty 
organization of "mutual 
defense" which was sufficient 
indication to the powers 
concerned that the U.S. would 
not sit qui e tly by if a 
Communist government were 
elected in South Vietnam. 
It is interesting to note that 
Secretary of State John Foster 
Dulles, was trying to convince 
England that the two countries 
should join together with France 
for an all-out attack on the 
Vietminh to end, once and for 
all, those impudent Asians who 
thought they could fight for 
their freedom. England wasn't 
buying any of that (ironic how 
the roles had become reversed!) 
and the U.S. had to settle for the 
famous Geneva Agreements, 
which we didn't sign, choosing 
instead to issue a separate 
declaration that we would 
"refrain from the threat or use 
of force to disturb them." 
Slowly, first in hundreds 
and then in thousands' and 
eventually hundreds of 
thousands, United States troops 
came into South Vietnam. In 
1960 the National Liberation 
Front, the "Viet Cong," was 
formed in the South to combat 
the ever-growing "foreign" 
menace. What started as a civil 
the United States through war was mushrooming rapidly, 
and soon we were bombing at a 
rate that exceeded all the ton-
nage dropped in World War II, 
The North Vietnamese 
witnessing the pli~t of their 
countrymen in the South, and 
seeing an in,vading army of 
Americans at their doorstep, 
took an active part in the 
conflict, but only after U.S. 
troops had landed. This brings 
up an interesting point. If, as the 
Geneva Accords say, Vietnam is 
really one country, who's 
invading whom? 
The Vietnamese are fighting 
LETTERS TO EDITOR 
. for their country - they have a 
cause, and we have united them . . 
Nothing brings a family or a 
country closer together than the 
threat of outside interference, 
and 'we have unwittingly done 
just that. They'll fight, like we 
would fight, from street to street 
and door to door to defend their 
homeland. The highly unreliable 
South Vietnamese Army is the 
only hope that now exists for 
those in the United States who 
feel military victory is still 
possible. Talk to some of the 
B.S.C. veterans who have been 
MORATORIUM ensue if these desires are met, and all this in the name of paid for, abroad. to Vietnam, and find out how The Moratorium stand, they appraise the fighting 
I'd just like to write and peace??? then, seems to ignore and potential of the A.R.V.N .'s. I 
express my views on the October Doesn't "peace" mean no belittle the security of many of have, and the total summation 
15th Moratorium. h t'lit' b h th 1 f V'et m d os lies on ot sides, and e peop e 0 I na an paints a dismal picture of an 
It seems that a great deal of isn't peace a bi-lateral Southeast Asja, in favor of a Army with an astronomical 
talk and action has gone into the agreement? Then the form of security a,t home status. desertion rate and a professed 
organization of this "Day of action that this Moratorium God willing it were unwillingness to seek the 
Peace," and little has been said committee is advocating has otherwise, but we can't stand at "enemy." 
about any other views on the little value as a "peace" effort, home any more, we must be Put yourself in the position 
subject. Being a newspaper, you and merely serves to encourage concerned and help others, and of South Vietnamese. Who 
cover both sides of all major the open and unopposed the ghost of Munich must stay would you consider the enemy, 
issues confronting BSC, and so "liberation" of the country by dead. . . 
here are a few ideas of the the guy who llves m the next 
the Vietcong. True p'eace comes God bless us all, everyone- village, who speaks your 
Anti-Peace Day people, or at through armistice, and armed T. J. Gallagher language and looks, acts, and is 
least what I can see of them. d P S V peace, an eventual bi-lateral rotect o. ietnam like you, or the white man from 
1) This has been variously negotiations. It is not, cannot, I feel something must be said across the wide wide ocean? 
billed as a day of "meditation," and will not be achl'eved by a If l' t t d th- U S . against the moratorium on Oct. ve rea e e.. a 
"reflection on this country's holus-bolus withdrawal of U.S. 15. I'm not against peace, but I little roughly, it is only because I 
decisions on Vietnam's future," troops. cannot support an immediate feel that we've made a dreadful 
and a day of strike on some I grant that little if any withdrawal without some type mistake in Vietnam that we 
campuses. Yet, at the same time, consequence has yet come of a of protection for the people of should rectify immediately. How 
numerous overtones seem to be lasting peace, but can we justify South Vietnam. I believe that much longer will the slaughter 
clouding the issue- our own hasty withdrawal as a until the free people of South continue? 
a. student dissatisfaction at "peace effort" or "bribe" to Vietnam can stand on their own 1 ..... - ...... H ... e'Tli,..c-o-p":'t-er-s--:-b-r-o-u-g.,..h.,...t ..... in~t-:-h-e 
school Hanoi, when it is only for our feet and fight the spread of basic needs of ammunition, food 
b. student dissatisfaction own interests, and disregards the Communism in their country, and water at a tremendous risk, 
with the Administration's ideas of freedom we hope to one then we should remain to help because of the heavy enemy 
national policies other than day see established in Vietnam? them. -They should not be ground fire. But this was not 
Vietnam. Whether our position as a abandoned to a group of enough for these men. They 
2) The main rallying cry "force to defend freedom," or a Communists who will never give believed that they were in 
seems to be "Immediate "p l' f ". d' t t f I o Ice orce IS IS as e u or them freedom, but will sllbmit danger of annihilation and 
withdrawal, NOW!", and a sort not, the fact remains that it is d Reprinted from the Boston them to constant torture an would go no farther. 
Globe, Tuesday, August 26, of "bring them all home" the end result, and the price .of terrorist tactics. The flow of Maj. Waite and Sgt. 
attitude that seems a bit world h'st y d tu e 'th 1969: 1 or an n , nel er Communism must be stopped Blankenship heard them out, 
short-sighted, peace being the of which can be turned aside or SONG CHANG V ALLEY, now, or else all of Southeast looking at the soldiers, most of 
end result. For it appears quite ign d D' t t f 1 't VIETNAM _ "I am sorry sir, but ore. IS as e u as I may Asia will. them a generation apart, draftees 
likely that a bloodbath, purge, well be the pn'ce of freedolTI at Respectfully -
my men refused to go - we ' , 19 and 20 with fear in their eyes. 
or nation-wide slaughter would home is charged and sometimes Kenneth J. Keenan cannot nlove out," Lt. Eugene~----___ ~~_~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ _____ ~_~~~~~ __ ~ Blankenship, a quick 
Shurtz, Jr. reported to his tempered man, began arguing. 
battalion commander over a Tuesday, the battalion had been A Company at one point in destroy them?" "One of them yelled to me 
crackling field telephone. trying to get to the wreckage. the fight was down to 60 men -- that his company had suffered 
Sunday morning, Bacon was 'half't . d t th "Leave it. with them," the 
'A' Company of the 196th IS asslgne s reng . t)O much and that it would not 
personally leading three of his colonel ordered. Light Infantry Brigade's Quietly the colonel told have to go on," Blankenship 
companies in the assault. He Then Bacon told his battle-worn 3rd Battalion had Shurtz to talk to them again and said. "1 answered him that paled as Shurtz matter-of-factly executive officer, Maj. Richard 15 been ordered at dawn Sunday to tell them that to the best of another company was down to told~ him the soldiers of A Waite, and one of his seasoned 
move once more down the their knowledge the bunkers men still on the move - and I Company would not follow his Vietnam veterans, Sgt. Okey jungle's rocky slope of Nui Lon were now empty - the enemy k f P lied to him - and he asked me, orders. Blan enship 0 anther, W. Va., 
Mountain into a deadly had withdrawn. The mission of "Why did they do it?" 
"Repeat that please," the to fly from the battalion base, "M b h h 
labYiinth of North Vietnamese A Company today I'S to recover "LZ C . " ay e t ey ave got Ilk d 'th t .. h' enter, across the valley bunkers and trench lines. co one as e WI ou ralSlng IS their dead. They have no reason something a little more than 
voice. "Have you told them to talk with the reluctant troops h h " th t For five days they had to be afraid. Please take ahand w at you ave got, e sergean 
what it means to disobey orders of A Company. l' d 
obeyed orders to make this count of how many really do rep Ie . under fire?" "Give them a pep talk and a 
push. Each time they had been not want to go. "Don't call us cowards, we 
"I think they understand," kick in the butt," he said. They d" h ld' 
thrown back by the invisible The lieutenant came back a are not co war s, t e so ler 
the lieutenant replied, "but found the men bearded and hid . t d 
enemy who waited through the few minutes later: "They won't 0 we, running owar 
some of them simply had exhausted in the tall blackened Bl k h' . h h' f' t . d 
rain of bombs and artillery shells go, colonel, and I did not ask for an ens IP Wit IS IS S raise . 
enough -- they are broken. There grass, their uniforms ripped and h' d h' b k for the Americans to come close, the hand count because I am Blankens IP turne IS ac 
are boys here who have only 90 caked with dirt. 
then picked them off with afraid that they all stick' and w a 1 ked dow n the days left in Vietnam: They want They said they were sick of 
deadly crossfire. together, even though some h dl b I' . h bomb-scarred ridge line to where to go home in one piece. The teen ess att mg In t e torrid The battalion commander, might prefer to go." the company commander 
situation is psychic here." heat, the constant danger of 
Lt. Col. .Robert C. Baco.l, ahd "Are you talking about The colonel told him: "leave sudden firefights by day and the waited. 
been waiting impatiently for A these men on the hl'll alld take . d b' The sergeant looked back enlisted men or are the NCO's mortanng an enemy pro mg at T 
Company to move out. Bacon our CP - Command Post -- . h Th 'd h h d and saw that the, men pf A also involved?" the colonel mg t. ey sal , t ey a not . 
had taken over the battalion asked. element and move to the enough sleep and that they were ·· .Company ..were stirrin~. ··:They 
after Lt. Eliot P. Howard was obJ'ective." picked up their rifles, fe'll into a 
"That's the difficulty here," being pushed too hard. They . 
killed in a helicopter crash with Shurtz said. "We've got a The Lieutenant said he was hadn't had mail. They hadn't loose formation, arid followed 
Associated Press photographer leadership problem. Most of our preparing to move and asked: had hot food. They hadn't had him down the catered slope. 
Oliver Noonan, and six other squad and platoon leaders have W'hat do we do with the the little things that made the A Company went back to 
men. Ever since the crash been killed or wounded." ammunition supplies? Shall we war bearable. the war. 
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CAMPUS INTERVIEWS ... 
Ouery on Vietnam 
Are we ofJliged to be in Vietnam? A re students justified in opposing Vietnam? 
Susanne Navias: We are not 
obligated to stay there. We went 
in after the French got kicked 
out and they implied that they 
would like to become involved. 
Bob Whitney: No, I am opposed 
to American Imperialism. 
, 
Cindy Curry: Yes, because they 
are fighting for freedom of 
people, but not if it's a political 
war which 1 think it is. 
Joanne Catanni: Yes, just as 
they ~re justified in opposing 
any social problem which exists 
in this country because of the ' 
guarantees of free speech and 
% assembly in the constitution. 
James Kircaldy : No. It 's hard to 
admit when you make a mistake, 
and then just call it quits, 
especially after all those people 
have been killed. 
Mr. Oien: It depends upon the 
type of disruption . Disruption of 
the normal life of the academic 
community is not to be 
permitted. 
James Hickey : Yes, it is their 
right. The nature of the country 
and democracy demands it. 
Sue Atwood I'm not for protest 
in marching . It doesn't do any 
good. Authority looks down 
upon peopl e who cannot 
com m unicate by means of 
talking. 
Shades of G~ndalf 
WON'T YOU HELP? PHOTO'S BY Vietnam is not funny. No, I'm afraid that not even the 
slightest chuckle can be aroused 
when 'Vietnam is discussed. I'm 
sure the thousands of men who 
have died and the thousands 
who are still fighting there don't 
thinl\ it is very funny either. Nor 
the cripples and amputees and 
vets back in the States. Nor the 
wido)Vs and parents and children 
of soldiers -- dead. Nor the 
Vietnamese who have died or 
lost their homes to screaming 
B-52's. Nor the draft resisters 
who are in prison because they 
obeyed their consciences. 
President Richard Nixon 
plays "My Wild Irish Rose" on 
his piano and asks us to wait. 
Every week we wait we usually 
lose a hundred or so men. Is Mr. 
Nixon a sadist? 
The love of the cross 
orphanage in Tan Binh 
Vietnam needs your 
support. 
The more than 200 
children there have been 
receiving 
aid from our government forces 
near by . 
(Continued from Page 1) 
Vietnam has touched the limit 
of its manpower capabilities. 
Civilian authorities claim that a 
new village devel'opment 
program is finally stimulating 
what they like to call rice-roots 
democracy. 
Even John Vann, the all-pro 
pessi m is tam 0 ng American 
officials here and the true source 
of much journalistic skepticism 
and not a few Pulitzer prizes, 
believes that during the Tet 
Offensive of 1968 the enemy 
alienated the great bulk of the 
popUlation . "Give us three more 
years," one AID official claims 
exultantly, "and we can wrap up 
the job." 
With that feeling widespread 
there is an understandable ' 
reluctance to let up on the 
military pressure. Accordingly, 
They can use 
many things that you 
don't need. Clothing, 
canned food, and money 
are some needed 
items. 
Look for future announcements 
for more information 






TROOP WITHDRAWAL BOGS DOW.N 
the iron rule is to consider troop 
withdrawal only as a function of 
replacement of American forces 
by South Vietnamese forces. But 
replacement is proceeding at a 
pace far slower than imagined in 
the United States. 
The S o uth Vietnamese 
forces , to begin with , are in poor 
shape. Only very few units -
notably the First Division up 
near the Demili tarized Zone--
a c t ually do front-line duty 
against the enemy. For the rest , 
desertion is high, night actions 
are scarce, and long-range 
patrolling, which is essential to 
a v 0 ids u r p r i s e s, is a I m 0 s t 
non-existent. 
Some improvement can be 
expected from re-equipment 
with modern weapons. But not 
speedily. The Army of Vietnam, 
or AR VN, is not expected to be 
fully re-equipped until June 30 
of next year. The South 
Vietnamese Navy and Air Force 
have as their re-equipment target 
June 30, 1972. 
Mo reover, Gen. Abrams 
points out that re-equipment is 
the least important feature of 
replacement. Far more 
important in his view are morale 
and leadership. "Every division 
in the Vietnamese army ," he 
says, "is different. And the 
difference lies mainly in the 
quality of the commanding 
officer. " 
But improving morale and 
leadership is proceeding even 
slower than re-equipment. This 
is not only because learning 
takes time. There is also the 
political test applied to military 
command by President Nguyen 
Van Thieu. 
President Thieu has his 
power base in the Vietnamese 
forces, and by no mere accident 
there is no military 
commander-in- chief. Gen. Thieu 
personally approves the 
appointments and transfers of all 
general officers. He moves at a 
pace that has caused some 
officials to baptize him "The 
Turtle: ' For instance, it took 
two years of American pressure 
at every level, including the 
presidential level, before he 
changed, only two weeks ago, 
the commanding generals of two 
notoriously ineffective divisions 
- the 5th and 18th divisions 
around Saigon. 
Among American officials, 
to be sure, there is a general 
recognition that public opinion 
back home is fed up with the 
war, and particularly upset 
President Nguyen Van Thieu 
sits back and sees the white men 
from America fighting his war. 
Would he help us fight one? 
What about You? Do You 
think it's funny? Have you done 
anything? Don't you think it's 
time y ou got off your ass and 
did something? October IS is 
your chance. Vietnam is not 
funny. 
about high casualties. Still public 
opinion is usually mentioned 
here in disparaging terms - not 
as the motor of American 
democracy, but as something 
shaped, ·or rather misshaped, by 
th6 press. 
To be sure , no one here 
is prepared for direct resistance 
to specific orders on troop 
reduction . But if the Nixon 
Administration truly wants 
troop withdrawal as a 
meaningful policy, a policy to be 
used for the President in 1972 
and against Democratic jibes in 
' 1970, then Mr. Nixon is going to 
have to do a lot more than 
simply go through the motions 
of a routine winding-down. He is 
going to have to assert the logic 
of troop withdrawals in an 
out-spoken, vigorous, and 
unambiguous way. 
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